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THE BA!(OMETEl< is a student bi-weekly newspaper for 
the exchange of ideas and infonnation concerninq 
the development and improvement of the professional 
environment at the Naval Postqraduate School. Items 
of interest, papers, and articles of interest to the 
students, staff, and faculty as a whole are solicited 
by the editors. 
-I want to emphasize that, while the results of the 
Caracas session were not all we hoped for, the session 
was not a failure. A most siqnificant result was the 
apparent aqreement of most nations represented there 
that the interests of all sill be best served by an 
acceptable and timely treaty.-
(Statement by Ambassador John R. Stevenson, Chainnan of the u.s. 
delegation to the Third u.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in 
his report to the Senate Committee on Foreiqn rtelations on 
September 5,1974) 
EDITO~IAL COMMENT: Our feature article for this, our final issue for the second 
quarter, comes fram the November-December 1974 issue of National Defense. The 
author of the article is Mr. P. Eleson, reported by the maqazine to be an 
experienced author on technical subjects with an interest in oceanography and 
underwater ordnance. 
FEATURE ARTICLE: LAW OF THE SEA 
-The much-touted, now-completed United Nations Law of the Sea Conference at 
Caracas, Venezuela, hardly deserves comment, except to note that it was pretty 
much of a failure all the way--despite repeated claims to the contraty by State 
Department personael who attended for the U.S. There was a great deal of talk 
as every national delegation went to qreat lengths to state and restate its posi-
tions. While there was some further definition and narrowing of the issues, no 
substantive aqreement was forthcoming on any siqnificant point. 
The truth of the matter is that, virtually without exception, no conventional 
law of the sea has ever evolved that had not first developed as customary law. 
For example, the three 1958 Geneva conventions on the law of the sea in the main 
consisted of a formalization of practices that already had become customary. It 
seems hiqhly unlikely that this reality of international life and commerce can be 
abrogated merely because a collection of national and international bureaucrats 
and academicians wills it so. Responsible State Department personnel should 
realize this. If they do not, they stand to cost America heavily. 
The U.S. Navy shares the blame, and just as foolishly. One of the big, biq 
issues is -free transit- throuqh international straits, the waters of which would 
became sovereiqn seas under a territorial sea limit of 12 nautical miles--now a 
more common limit than the heretofore traditional 3 nautical miles. -Free transit-
would include submerqed submarines without pr ior notification, and overfliqht by 
both civil and military aircraft. In the territorial seas, overfliqht withou~ 




by submarines is not per.mitted. Navy touts free transit as absolutely essential 
to the maintenance of its strategic posture, etc. 
But this is hogwash. If they really want to, the latest military submarines 
can go pretty much where they wish in silence and anonymity, unless the strait in 
question is heavily covered by surveillance year--in which case any advantaqe of 
of submerqed transit would be lost anyhow. further, keeping in mind the basic 
principles of the development of acceptable internatlonal law noted above, even 
should free transit be aqreed to in some forthcoming law-of-the-sea conference, 
it would remain valid only until the first country abutting a strait decided it 
didn't like free transit, and that would be the end of it. 
International law, it must be remember, is not like domestic law. Domestic 
law is enforceable. There are courts and, more importantly, police forces whose 
existence and jurisdiction are accepted. In international law there is the in-
ternational Court of Justice at The Hague, and there are customary mechani.ms 
for arbitration of disputes. There is, however, no police force, other than the 
torce of world public opinion--which,historically, has proved only marginally 
effective. ~ould a small, developing state stand up against the -big bully-
U.S. and bar its military craft from free transit, odds are very good that the 
preponderance ow world public opinion (basis: one nation, one vote) would be 
against the U.S.--any formalized law-of-the-sea convention that might exist to 
the contrary notwithstanding. 
Meanwhile the State Department (with the enthusiastic support of the Navy) 
«sic.» seems ready to make just about any concession necessary to win support 
for its straits stand--including serious concessions in respect of the management 
and rights of cammercial fisheries, ocean minerals, and the regime under which 
oceanographers would be expected to conduct their at-sea research. in other words, 
the U.S. seems prepared to give away hard and important rights (critically important 
to our balance of payments and future minerals and energy supplies) in order to 
win consensus on a myth. It's a poor trade, and it is pitiful that Congress and 
the white House don't appreciate it. Another U.N. Law of the Sea Conference pro-
bably will be convened next year in Vienna. If that doesn't produce agreement, 
t'hey'll try again.-
E1HTOHIAL COMMENT: We hope our readers will take this opportunity to again check 
the credentials of the author of our feature article. Those interested in the •• 
historic and important law-of-the-sea conferences may desire to read the full 
report to the Senate Committee on Foreign ~elations as reported in the ~ptember 
23, 197~ issue of the Department of State Bulletin. In part, a statement by 
John R. Stevenson bears consideratlon: 
-Each state here, depending upon its situation and circumstances, has a 
different idea of the relative importance of different issues and how the blanks 
should be filled in. The U.S. and some others have stated that it is essential 
to preserve unimpeded passaqe of straits and the general rights of navigation, in 
which all countries which trade with the rest of the world have a vital interest. 
There are differences as to the balance of coastal state rights and duties within 
the economic zone. (200 miles) There are differences as to how the problem of 
pollution within the zone should be handled and how scientific research can be 
conducted in a fashion that will not hinder research but will also recognize the 
intere.ts of states in activities near their coasts. Th~re are differences as to 
how and by whome the deep seabed should be exploited.- nJudguents of t~ future, ~ 
infor.med judgments on the best course for peace and stability of the world, must 
be made by men and governments in good faith and a spirit of con~romise.· 
Fk'OM THE EDITOR: We, th~ edi.tnrs of THE BArc:OMETEK, wish to extend our congratulations 
and best wishes 0 our compatriots who are graduating. Smooth sailing, fr lends , 
until we meet again. Especially we wish to extend our regaids and thanks to our 
departing co-editor Pat Shephard. To the rest of our readers, as well as our de-
partinq ones, we wish a happy and safe holiday season. 
A new member has joined the staff of THE BAKU~~TEH. He is LT Eric Benson, USNA'71. 
He is in the We~pons System Curriculum and his background is surface warfare. 
Welcome. 
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"He who commands the sea has command of everything." 
Themistocles 
- .. 
EDITORS NOTE: Welcome back to the third quarter at NPS. To those of you who are reading 
THE BAROMETER for the first time the editors would like to explain that it is our purpose 
to present our readers with articles, some controversial, some newsworthy, some topical, 
which we have found and think would be of interest to a professional Naval Officer. As the 
heading states, we solicit such articles from our readers. The BAROMETER is published 
every two weeks. The last issue of THE BAROMETER presented some ideas, pro and con, on the 
Law-of-the-Sea conference held last year in Caracas, Venezuela. The feature article for 
this issue explores one of the biggest issues, in the eyes of the United States - of that 
conference. The author, John E. Lawyer, Jr. is a Ph.D. candidate at the Fletcher School 
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. The article appeared in the September-October 
issue of the Air University Review. 
FEATURE ARTICLE: INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 
"Until recently, developments in international law of the sea were even those with an 
active stake in international affairs, could safely afford to ignore. This is no longer 
the case. Access to offshore oil and gas deposits has become increasingly important as 
the energy crisis continues to color world events. Control of ocean fisheries is hardly 
less important since fish and fishmeal supply a major source of world protein requirements. 
These and related developments in an evolving set of sometimes complementary, sometimes 
contradictory maritime policies form the substance of the work that the Third United 
Nations Law of the Sea Conference will tackle over the next year or so. The conference 
formally opened at U.N. Headquarters in New York in December 1973. Delegations did not 
get down to grappling with substantive differences, however, until the first working session, 
which opened in Caracas in the summer of 1974. The negotiations are expected to continue 
over a period of months, perhaps as long as two years. 
From a national security point of view, the question of transit through and over 
international straits is probably the most important single issue to come before the 
conference. International straits have long been recognized as critical choke points in 
~ the flow of international trade and in the deployment of military power. More recently 
they have assumed increasing significance in terms of the regular supply of the oil 
essential to fuel a modern economy. More important, they are crucial to the deployment 
of national air and naval forces into the basins they connect. For example, our only easy 
and unrestricted access into the Mediterranean basin, and to the Middle East beyond, is 
through or over the Strait of Gibraltar. 
An international strait, according to the doctrine laid down in 1949 by the International 
Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case and subsequently codified in the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, is any strait connecting two 
portions of the high seas. That the right of innocent passage through such bodies of 
water extends to warships as well as merchant vessels was established by the Court in the 
same decision, and this appears to be taken for granted in the 1958 Geneva Convention. 
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This right is generally seen as a necessary consequence and extension of the freedom of 
the high seas, which freedom would be significantly curtailed in international straits could 
be closed more or less at will be the coastal state or states. The International Court 
further held in the Corfu Channel decision that is geography rather than actual use which 
determines whether or not a strait is such an international highway. It does not matter 
whether the territory on both sides of the strait is possessed by a single state or by 
two or more nations, nor does it matter whether the territorial waters meet somewhere 
in the middle. 
At present, a majority of the nations of the world claim a twelve-mile territorial sea; 
but a substantial minority, which includes most of the major maritime nations (except the 
U.S.S.R.), recognize only three miles. The significance of this difference is that, were 
the emerging consensus on the twelve-mile limit to become a formal, universally recognized 
legal norm, upwards of one hundred international straits that are traversed by a high 
seas corridor under the present three-mile concept would, under a twelve-mile regime, be 
completely overlapped by the territorial waters of the adjacent coastal state or states. 
Unless some special provision were made for international straits, transits through and 
over these important passages would thus come substantially under the control of the coastal 
states, subject only to a provision for innocent passage of naval vessels. This is 
basically the position being pushed by most coastal states not having substantial fleets 
of their own. These hundred-odd straits that are more than six but less than 24 miles 
wide include the English Channel at Dover, Gibraltar, Malacca, and many of the other major 
straits of the world. 
In contrast to this trend, the United States has consistently insisted that recog-
nition of a twelve-mile limit in place of the traditional three miles must be coupled 
with some provision that would retain the right of free transit (as opposed to innocent 
passage) through and over such vital world waterways. The difference between free transit 
and innocent passage is a critical one from the security point of view. Under the regime 
of innocent passage codified in Section III of the 1958 Geneva Convention, the rule is 
established that transit is innocent only 'so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal state.' The last section of the article also 
requires that submarines exercising the right of innocent passage navigate on the surface, 
showing their flag. In Article 16 a coastal state is given the right to 'the the necessary 
steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent.' This phraseology 
is nebulous enough as it stands; furthermore, the use of the word 'prejudicial' suggests 
that an actual injury to peace, good order, or security need not be taking place for the 
passage to be deemed no longer innocent. If a reasonable chance exists that such injury 
may be in the offing, the coastal state would be in a strong position to decide that the 
passage is not innocent and exclude the vessel from its territorial waters. 
Though the 1958 Geneva Convention prohibits the suspension of innocent passage in 
international straits, it does not thus prohibit states from deciding that a given transit-
or, more important, class of transits-is noninnocent and taking preventive steps. While 
under current international law and practice the coastal state appears to be able to make 
this decision unilaterally, if the decision were applied so as to preclude what another 
power regarded as a vital transit right, it is unlikely that the flag state would quietly 
acquiesce. For example, as the Chairman of the DOD Advisory Group on the Law of the Sea 
Leigh Ratiner, has written: 
... thus it can be assumed that if Spain were to close the Strait of Gibraltar to all 
warships, and efforts to change the Spanish position through negotiation were to fail, 
some state would nevertheless exercise its right to transit the Strait of Gibraltar. 
It is equally likely that the United States would challenge any coastal state's assertion 
that nuclear-powered warships were by their very nature too hazardous to be accepted as 
innocent, and that Japan would not quietly acquiesce in an Indonesian decision that the 
passage of supertankers through various Indonesian-claimed straits posed too great a 
risk of a super oil spill to be permitted. 
The degree to which other nations take sides in what could quickly degenerate into an 
international Shouting match (or worse) would probably depend more on political factors 
than, strictly speaking, on any clear reading of international law, though no doubt 
everyone would point with great righteousness to one rule or another to prove his case. 
Nor would it be realistic to suggest that political factors would play no part in the 
coastal state's original contention. 
International law of the air does not recognize any right for aircraft overflight 
comparable to innocent passage for vessels. In maritime law, as mentioned earlier, 
innocent passage is derived as a necessary consequence of freedom of navigation on the 
high seas, a reflection of the geographical and physical contraints that limit the movement 
of Ships. No such constraints apply to aircraft, which can overfly the barriers of 
, . 
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geography, so there is no provision for 'innocent overflight' in international law. The 
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944), which sets the basic pattern 
for signatories' overflight and landing rights, applies only to commercial aircraft. 
Decisions on military overflight are thus within the sole competence of each country for 
its Own airspace. Article 2 of the Chicago Convention also recognizes the 'complete and 
exclusive sovereignty' of a state in the airspace over its territorial' sea. 
The extent of a state's territorial sea thus becomes a critical question with respect 
to the free navigation and overflight of straits. Extending the width of the territorial 
sea to a twelve-mile limit would put a powerful new political lever into the hands of 
coastal states, not all of which are friendly to the United , States. Even among those 
governments associated with u.s. security objectives, it would be unrealistic not to expect 
them to use this leverage in sup~ort of their own objectives vis-a-vis the U.S. government. 
In view of this fact, one might wonder whether the U.S. has any interest in recognizing 
a twelve-mile limit, even if most other countries are urging it. Unfortunately, the matter 
is not that easy to resolve. Not surprisingly, the width of the territorial sea has been 
one of the most sensitive issues in maritime law. Despite at least two close attempts, 
the world community has not so far been able to agree on a general accepted limit, either 
in the 1958 Convention or elsewhere. That convention did at least succeed in setting a 
theoretical maximum limit: Article 24 states that the contiguous zone, adjacent but 
external to the territorial sea, shall not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from 
which the territorial sea itself is also measured, thus indirectly and tacitly limiting 
the, maximum breadth of the territorial sea to twelve miles. 
The lack of an explicit consensus and the variety of state practices, however, have 
encouraged some states to advance more extensive claims in recent years. Brazil, for 
instance, has proclaimed a 200-mile territorial sea, which sweeps out across an enormous 
area of the South Atlantic. Certain archipelago states, notably Indonesia and the 
Philippines, have declared vast areas of formerly open sea to be their internal waters by 
the simple device of drawing the baselines from the projecting capes and headlands of 
their outermost islands and measuring outwards from there. Unless this tendency towards 
proliferating claims beyond a twelve-mile li~it can quickly be brought under control 
through international agreement, the tendency to stake out extensive national maritime 
claims will degenerate into a veritable scramble. It could conceivably end in denying 
the ' U.S. important operating freedoms in large sectors of formerly open air and sea space 
or at least requiring uS to pay for them-nor would the price be limited to money. 
Within the United States government, the Inter-Agency Task Force on the Law of the Sea 
is the main body in which the U.S. negotiating position is hammered out. This group 
includes high-level representatives of, the Departments of State, Defense, Interior, 
Commerce, Justice, and Transportation and representiatives of the National Security Council 
Staff, the National Science Foundation, and the Natio,nal Council on Marine Resources and 
Engineering Development. Though the committee is normally chaired by State, the Defense 
view generally seems to have been the most weighty in formulating the overall U.S. position. 
As Mr. Ratiner has written concerning the thinking behind the American position on the 
straits issue: 
Nations which depend on their merchant marine and navies for economic and national 
security ... can be strangled by having access to oceans limited or delayed when passing 
through narrow international straits. Submerged passage of submarines, overflight of 
aircraft, and freedom from restrictions generally would disappear ... (or) depend on the 
good graces of the coastal state or states bordering the strait in question. Such a 
result would be unacceptable to any country with global interests, a global foreign 
policy, a large me'rchant marine, and a large navy and air force. It is principally 
for this reason that the United States has opposed territorial sea extensions beyond 
3 miles. 
Clearly what he terms the 'vital national security interests' prevail in the overall U.S. 
position, reflecting Navy and Air Force concern to preserve maximum freedom of navigation 
and overflight. Were the U.S. to be denied free access through the Strait of Gibraltar, 
for instance, the utility of the large naval base just a few miles to the west at Rota, 
a key point for the deploy~ent of U.S. nuclear-powered sq~marines carrying a signific~nt 
portion of the American strategic deterrent, would be greatly ,reduced. 
Even within the security community, however, not all Western strategists share the 
official U.S. view that continued unrestricted access through international straits is 
central to the Western security position. To quote' one recent anlyst, FriedheIm Kruger-
Sprengel: 
... as most of the coastal states in the North Atlantic area are NATO countries, a 
broader territorial sea can generally be regarded as not a threat to the mobility of 
NATO ,naval forces. On the contrary, a broader territorial sea gives NATO states 
additional opportunities of keeping foreign warships, farther from their coasts, should 
security interests make such a step necessary .... From the point of view of the NATO 
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states in Europe, there is no necessity to strengthen the right of passage in the 
seas around Europe, for such a measure would only favor the navies of the Soviet Union 
and other Warsaw Pact states. 
• t 
In light of the fact that approximately half of the Soviet military shipbuilding capacity 
is in the Baltic area and Leningrad is the U.S.S.R. 's most important port, he argues that 
a twelve-mile territorial sea, at least in the Baltic area, would on balance serve Western 
interests better than those of the Soviets. Where necessary in given strategic straits, 
according to this view, the West could ensure its rights by negotiating specific bilateral 
agreements, a task that might be easier than persuading the whole international community 
to accede to the U.S. pOSition in the forthcoming negotiations. 
There are in fact some indications that the U.S. government is reacting to the growing 
pressure against an unyielding American position on the straits issue and, rather than 
seeking for a universalistic rule covering all hundred-odd straits, is concentrating its 
attention the sixteen designated 'Straits of Major Importance' listed by the Geographer of 
the Department of State. If the U.S. does in fact fall back to some such position, it may 
well prove to be the one step backward that makes possible the two steps forward to an ~ 
agreement. 
Among the major maritime powers, Russia alone presently claims a twelve-mile territorial 
sea, a position that goes back to Lenin himself. This traditional claim provides the 
technical basis for the apparent doubld standard the U.S.S.R. hasadbptedwith respect to 
navigation of international straits. The Soviets demand free transit only though those 
straits that would be affected by expanding the present territorial sea to twelve miles; 
those already under a twelve-mile regime, which includes all those in Soviet waters, thus 
would not be included. The Soviets do not recognize the right of innocent passage through 
their territiorial sea. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan all currently 
recognize only a three-mile territorial sea, but all three have formally stated they 
would be willing to accept a twelve-mile limit as part of a satisfactory overall settlement. 
Nor should one overlook the degree to which the old patterns of international politics 
have eroded, at least in this one area. The Soviets have publicly endorsed the U.S. 
'free transit' approach, while the American delegate has scrupulously refrained from attack-
ing or even mentioning the double standard implicit in the Soviet reservations. Spain, 
though tied to Western security interests through the broad-ranging 1970 Agreement of Friend-
ship and Cooperations with the United States, has been leading the attack on the position 
the U.s. government feels is 'vital' to its global strategic security responsibilities. 
In this, Spain has had the strong support of the Latin Americans, who, with no immediate 
stake in straits navigation, are probably more influenced by the chances of Spanish 
support on the fisheries questions than by the much-vaunted ties of a cornmon cultural 
heritage. Some NATO thinkers likewise seem to discount any real danger to the security 
of the West, and many in NATO are probably more bothered by the possibility of a Soviet-
American rapprochement that would to some extent freeze them out than by the specter of 
restricted navigation through ·international straits. 
In East Asia, the Japanese, though still trying to preserve as Iowa profile as possible 
in international politics, are being inevitably pushed to center stage. At some point, 
however, they will have to choose between accepting the greater degree of coastal state 
control over their access to vital energy supplies implicit in a twelve-mile territorial 
sea, on the one had, and, on the other, by their opposition to a twelve-mile limit, 
antagonizing South Asian neighbors ,whose goodwill they have been diligently cultivating 
for: some years. 
In matters of the law of the sea, as in most questions, each national perceives its 
national interests differently. The U.S. seeks to preserve its global strategic advantage, 
an important component of which is the ability to project American air and naval forces 
through and over the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East 
area. The Soviets, with extensive oil supplies within their own sphere, likewise appear ~ 
more concerned with the strategic aspects of free transit than with the economic aspects, 
especially since their access by submarine between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean is 
currently restricted by the Montreux Convention. The Japanese, on the other hand, are 
primarily concerned with continued access through Malacca and other Indonesian-claimed 
straits to the Middle East oil supplies essential to their economy. The British have both 
extensive trade and security interests; their position is in addition complicated by 
particular historical connections with Gibraltar, Singapore, the Channel, etc. But 
generally, these states, as major maritime powers, favor as liberal a regime for international 
states as possible. 
By contrast, most coastal states perceive their advantage to lie in as restrictive a 
regime as possible. This in part sterns from a genuine desire to protect their shores, 
populations, and fisheries from pollution or nuclear accident. The memory of the Palomares 
incident is still a factor in the Spanish policy, and the Torrey Canyon disaster has been 
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cited by the Malaysian delegate in past debates. But beyond these legitimate concerns, 
coastal states would also no doubt like to increase their leverage in international affairs, 
and they see increased control over vital waterways as an effective means to that end. 
How can all the various political, institutional, strategic, and even physical factors 
that cluster around the straits issue be accommodated, to say nothing of the question of 
trade-offs between the straits issue and others, such as conservation of fisheries or 
control over natural resources explotiation? 
As another commentation, Louis Henkin, has pointed out, 'Law is shaped by the interplay 
of a variety of national interests in a complicated political process.' The ultimate 
resolution of the matter will evolve from hard bargaining based on several sets of 
competing national interests between straits states and user states, maritime industrial 
countries and underdeveloped countries, conservating and radical govenrments, land-locked 
and coastal states, etc. 
~ In view of the variety of interests involved, it is not to be wondered at that the 
negotiating process to date has been difficult and often uncompromising. The preponderance 
of intensely nationalist states among the less-developed countries, many of which played 
nor part in negotiating the 1958 accords, and the' general reluctance of the Department of 
Defense to favor concessions in the u.s. position, have in the past tended to produce a 
climate emerging as national delegations come to grips with the specific problems 
they must face in reaching an acceptable agreement. The high stakes involved and the 
relatively high degree of ignorance in a number of delegations about the complex legal and 
technical factors bearing on the situation have both added to the difficulties inherent in 
the negotiating situation. 
At the same time, the diversity of interests involved ought to make for some degree 
of flexibility in the negotiating process. It would be important in this respect, however, 
that the whole set of trade-offs and compromises between security, energy, fisheries, and 
seabed resources interests be written into a single package, as the United States and 
others are advocating. Otherwise, if states are left free to pick and choose among 
several separate conventions dealing with these topics, as was the case with the 1958 
Geneva accords, it is unlikely that a workable measure of agreement could be achieved. 
States would simply ratify those measures that further their interests and ignore the rest, 
vitiating the whole concept of a negotiated bargain in which concessions must be made in 
one area to secure benefits in another." 
